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Property rights play an important but largely under-appreciated role in 
channeling local knowledge into decisions about physical resources.  They do 
this by devolving decision-making authority to a dispersed pool of owners, who 
are likely to be aware of local conditions relevant to their resources.  As a result, 
property owners are often in a position to make better-informed decisions about 
the use of the resources than other parties.  This article seeks to explain the local 
knowledge function of property rights, beginning with how arguments from 
local knowledge can help justify the pervasive institution of private property.  
The article then goes on to consider how the knowledge function of property can 
explain some of the fundamental features of property law. 
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Arguments from local knowledge are distinct from other arguments about 
property’s justification.  The standard justifications for property rights—those 
that might be discussed in a first-year Property law course, for instance1—
include: 1) Lockean arguments, according to which a party who labors on a 
resource has a justified claim to it;2 2) economic efficiency arguments based on 
the role of property rights in avoiding a “tragedy of the commons,”3 or 
incentivizing parties to work and invest in resources;4 3) autonomy-oriented 
arguments based on the role of property in creating a sphere of freedom for the 
individual;5 4) arguments based on property’s potential to promote virtue and 
human flourishing;6 and 5) personhood arguments based on the idea that some 
objects of property are constitutive of individual identity.7  None of these 
arguments relies, to any significant degree, on the special local knowledge 
owners acquire regarding their resources.  Indeed, discussions of the justification 
for property almost always leave out the important idea that property owners are 
often simply better informed about their resources than others and thus better 
equipped to make decisions about them. 
The role of property rights in channeling local knowledge is likely under-
appreciated, by first-year Property students and seasoned property scholars 
alike, largely because property rights are so pervasive in contemporary Western 
societies.  We are simply not aware of the many instances that occur every day 
in which an owner acts on local knowledge that would be difficult or impossible 
for others to acquire and process.  The homeowner who preemptively repairs an 
old roof, the retailer who offers a new product for sale, and the farmer who 
 
 1. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES 174−280 (7th ed. 2017); BRUCE ZIFF ET AL., A PROPERTY LAW READER: CASES, 
QUESTIONS, & COMMENTARY 29−38 (4th ed. 2016). 
 2. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18 (Richard H. Cox ed., 1982); 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 171−72 (1974). 
 3. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40−41 (8th ed. 2011); F.H. Knight, 
Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582 (1924); Garrett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 4. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360−66 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What Happened to 
Property?]; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7−8; ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 9−86 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1978); POSNER, supra note 3, at 40; 
Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Property Rights and Economic Development, in 5 
HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 4525, 4529−34 (Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig 
eds., 2009) (formal model of the effect of insecure property rights in disincentivizing production). 
 5. Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 215 (2006); ARTHUR 
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 86, 91 (2009). 
 6. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 748 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of 
Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQS. LAW 127 (2009); Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and 
Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property, 43 H.K.L.J. 451 (2013). 
 7. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); G.W.F. 
HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 73−83 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet, trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). 
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decides to switch crops are all decision-makers who are empowered through 
property rights to act on local knowledge that no one else may have.  In a society 
of property owners, we have come to take for granted the vast body of local 
knowledge that is mobilized by owners with the power to make decisions about 
their resources.8  Importantly, this body of knowledge cannot easily be acquired, 
processed, and acted upon through centralized, hierarchical decision-making 
apparatuses.9  By decentralizing decision-making authority, property rights help 
channel local knowledge into decisions about resources. 
The knowledge function of property rights is perhaps easiest to see in cases 
where property rights are removed and replaced by the comprehensive, 
centralized governance of resources.  For instance, the disastrous consequences 
of the large-scale collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union and China 
in the 20th century are now relatively well known.10  Agricultural collectivization 
failed in part because it centralized decision-making, depriving those with 
knowledge of circumstances on the ground of the ability to act on their 
knowledge.11 
These examples may seem somewhat distant and exotic to contemporary 
North Americans.  Yet North America has its own history of top-down land 
administration by centralized bureaucracies acting without the benefit of local 
knowledge.  Beginning in the 19th century, “Indian Affairs” departments in both 
the United States and Canada came to exert far-reaching control over day-to-day 
life in Indigenous communities, including over land management.12  These 
 
 8. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) 
[hereinafter Hayek, Use of Knowledge]. 
 9. Id. at 524. 
 10. In both the Soviet Union and China, the collectivization of agriculture led to millions of 
deaths, primarily from famine.  See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 
1318 (1993) (citing ROBERT CONQUEST, THE HARVEST OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION 
AND THE TERROR-FAMINE 306 (1986)); ROBERT C. TUCKER, STALIN IN POWER 639 n. 68 (1990); 
DMITRI VOLKOGONOV, STALIN: TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 524 (Harold Shukman ed. & trans., 
1991); Nicholas R. Lardy, The Chinese Economy Under Stress, 1958-1965, in 14 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF CHINA 360, 370 (Roderick MacFarquhar & John K. Fairbank eds., 1987); Justin Yifu 
Lin, Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1228, 1229 
(1990). 
 11. FREDERIC L. PRYOR, THE RED AND THE GREEN: THE RISE AND FALL OF COLLECTIVIZED 
AGRICULTURE IN MARXIST REGIMES 138, 147−48, 163−67 (1992) (outlining problems stemming 
from organization size, including asymmetric information between workers and managers, as well 
as the consequences of a lack of local autonomy, including lack of knowledge of local conditions); 
JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 210−18 (1998) (Scott explains how “high-modernist” 
thinking led Soviet planners to implement schemes for large-scale farming operations with 
centralized decision-making processes.  The plans failed in large part because of the inability to 
respond to local knowledge.)  But see, e.g., Yifu Lin, supra note 10 (emphasizing the incentive 
effect of a lack of exit rights on collective farms). 
 12. See generally Stephen Cornell, Remaking the Tools of Governance: Colonial Legacies, 
Indigenous Solutions, in REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 57−60 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007); TERRY L. ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS 
OR RESERVATIONS?: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 161−76 (1995); 1 COHEN’S 
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centralized bureaucracies typically displaced pre-existing Indigenous 
governance structures and property systems.13  Decisions about resources that 
had previously been made at the local level were subject to control, oversight, 
and approval by a hierarchically structured bureaucracy headquartered in a 
distant federal capital.14  This centralization has tended to impair the ability of 
institutions to take account of local knowledge.15 
To give one particularly egregious example, during the 1870’s, Canadian 
government officials determined that wheat should be among the crops 
cultivated on government-administered farms for First Nations in what is now 
Alberta and Saskatchewan.16  This was despite the fact that the strains of wheat 
that existed at the time did not have a sufficiently short growing season for the 
region, and despite a lack of grist mills in the area to process the wheat.17  The 
farms were mostly failures.18  Even when wheat was successfully grown, it 
sometimes could not be used.19  There are, in fact, accounts of First Nations 
people starving next to stacks of wheat, grown at the direction of federal 
officials, which they could not grind into flour.20  Of course, parties on the 
ground were aware that wheat was not the best choice of crop under the 
circumstances, but they were unable to effectively act on that knowledge.  On-
 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §1.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2019); Fred S. 
McChesney, Government as Definer of Property Rights: Indian Lands, Ethnic Externalities, and 
Bureaucratic Budgets, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 297, 322−35; Malcolm Lavoie & Moira Lavoie, Land 
Regime Choice in Close-Knit Communities: The Case of the First Nations Land Management Act, 
54 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 559, 561 (2017); TOM FLANAGAN ET AL., BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT: 
RESTORING ABORIGINAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 63−70 (2010); 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 283−85 (1996) (Can.); 2 REPORT OF THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 485−519 (1996) (Can.). 
 13. For an overview of one traditional Indigenous property system, see Richard Overstall, 
Encountering the Spirit in the Land: “Property” in a Kinship-Based Legal Order, in DESPOTIC 
DOMINION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES 22 (John McLaren, A.R. Buck & 
Nancy E. Wright, eds. 2005). 
 14. Lavoie & Lavoie, supra note 12, at 561, 567–68; 1 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW §1.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2019); FLANAGAN ET AL, BEYOND THE INDIAN 
ACT, supra note 12, at 45–46. 
 15. See FLANAGAN ET AL, BEYOND THE INDIAN ACT, supra note 12, at 125–35; Jessica A. 
Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Property, Sovereignty, and the Future, 115 
MICH. L. REV. 487, 512–22 (2017) [hereinafter Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow]; Jessica A. 
Shoemaker, Transforming Property: Reclaiming Indigenous Land Tenures, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 
1531, 1542−53 (2019) [hereinafter Shoemaker, Transforming Property]; HARVARD PROJECT ON 
AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: 
CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 5, 9−10, 113, 121, 125–29, 134 
(2008). 
 16. SARAH CARTER, LOST HARVESTS: PRAIRIE INDIAN RESERVE FARMERS AND 
GOVERNMENT POLICY 79, 91, 96, 99, 103 (1990). 
 17. Id. at 95−96. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 99. 
 20. Id. 
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reserve farming operations of that era mostly failed, in large part because 
Indigenous people were denied the opportunity to engage in the process of trial 
and error based on local knowledge that characterized the later success of other 
farmers in the region.21  In comparison with off-reserve farmers, First Nations 
farms were hampered by centralized control over seeds, farming implements, 
and the location of farms, among other factors.22 
Centralized, bureaucratic control over land management has had dire 
consequences for Indigenous people, as measured in economic and other 
terms.23  Indeed, in both the U.S. and Canada, federal control over local land 
management continues to impede Indigenous economic development and self-
determination to this day.  Decisions about Indigenous land often cannot easily 
be made by those who are physically present in the communities and aware of 
local circumstances.24  Special rules of land tenure in Indigenous communities, 
including the federal trust status of Indigenous lands in the United States, are a 
major source of ongoing bureaucratic control and oversight over decision-
making.25  These rules of land tenure go beyond restraining alienation, and often 
impair ordinary decision-making about the use and management of the land.  By 
contrast, in most contexts outside of Indigenous communities, property rights 
are the main institution that allows for decentralized control over resources by 
parties who are likely to have relevant local knowledge. 
In what follows, I will argue that channeling local knowledge is one of the 
most basic things that property law does, in most contexts in which property 
rights exist over physical resources.  Indeed, this knowledge-channeling 
 
 21. Id. at 94.  Beginning in the late 1880’s, other policies also came to impair First Nations’ 
agricultural operations, including a government policy of intentionally withholding farming 
technology.  Id. at 119, 164. 
 22. Id. at 95, 160−62. 
 23. See TOM FLANAGAN ET AL., supra note 12 at 123−36; ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 
111−34, 167−68; McChesney, supra note 12; Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow, supra note 15; 
Dustin Frye & Dominic P. Parker, Paternalism Versus Sovereignty: The Long-Run Economic 
Effects of the Indian Reorganization Act, in UNLOCKING THE WEALTH OF INDIAN NATIONS (Terry 
L. Anderson, ed., 2016); Terry L. Anderson & Dean Lueck, Land Tenure and Agricultural 
Productivity on Indian Reservations, 35 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1992); FISCAL REALITIES ECONOMISTS, 
THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF MARKET REFORMS AND LAND TITLING FOR FIRST 
NATIONS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007), http://www.fiscalrealities.com/uploads/1/0/7/1/107166
04/economic__fiscal_impacts_of_fn_market_reforms__land_titling.pdf; Terry L. Anderson & 
Dominic P. Parker, Economic Development Lessons from and for North American Indian 
Economies, 53 AUSTL. J. AGRIC. & RES. ECON. 105, 119−22 (2009). 
 24. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow, supra note 15, at 512−22; Shoemaker, Transforming 
Property, supra note 15, 1542−53; HARVARD PROJECT ON AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, THE STATE OF THE NATIVE NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF 
SELF-DETERMINATION 5, 9−10, 113, 121, 125–29, 134 (2008). 
 25. Jessica A. Shoemaker, No Sticks in my Bundle: Rethinking the Indian Land Tenure 
Problem, 63 KAN. L. REV. 383, 383−87 (2014).  These special property regimes may be capable of 
serving valuable functions, but in practice, they also often deny effective control over resources by 
parties on the ground.  See Malcolm Lavoie, Property Law and Collective Self-Government, 64 
MCGILL L.J. 255 (2018) [hereinafter Lavoie, Collective Self-Government]. 
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function of property can provide a persuasive justification for property rights.  
The local knowledge argument justifies property, rather than merely identifying 
a collateral benefit of property, since it provides a compelling normative account 
that fits the basic features of existing systems of property law.  The local 
knowledge argument can potentially appeal to those with a relatively diverse set 
of normative commitments.  Many objectives one might wish to achieve through 
a property system depend to some degree on harnessing local knowledge. 
A knowledge-based justification for property rights is in principle consistent 
with a relatively wide range of institutional arrangements.  Notably, it is 
perfectly consistent with schemes that aim to redistribute wealth.  Indeed, as I 
will discuss below, undue ownership concentration tends to undermine the 
knowledge function of property rights by centralizing resource decision-making 
in the hands of a relatively small number of owners.  An owner with many 
physical resources under his or her control may be no better positioned than a 
government bureaucracy to acquire and act upon local knowledge.  If most 
resources are owned by a narrow ownership class, there will be less physical 
proximity between owners and resources, and fewer opportunities for owners to 
acquire local knowledge relevant to their resources. 
The idea that property rights channel local knowledge is not novel.26  
However, writers who have given detailed accounts of the argument in the past 
have tended to emphasize the knowledge function of property in facilitating 
interpersonal coordination, primarily through market mechanisms.  According 
to F.A. Hayek, property rights allow parties to act upon their own “knowledge 
of the particular circumstances of time and place” in responding to price signals 
that emerge from a multitude of transactions.27  For instance, if the price of 
wheat increases, and a farmer owns a field that she knows would be suitable for 
growing wheat, the farmer can respond to the price signal by exploiting her 
knowledge of the attributes of her field.  At the same time, the price signal itself 
 
 26. See Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8; 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION 
AND LIBERTY 85−88, 106−10 (1982) [hereinafter HAYEK, LLL VOL 1]; F.A. Hayek, Socialist 
Calculation: The Competitive ‘Solution’, 7 ECONOMICA 125, 141, 144 (1940); F.A. HAYEK, THE 
FATAL CONCEIT, 29−37, 76−78 (W.W. Bartley, III ed. 1988); Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and 
Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 16−17 (1964); Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. 
Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 573−74 (2008); 
Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 965−66 (2009) (drawing an analogy between debates in 
property theory and the socialist calculation debate over the viability of a centrally planned 
economy) [hereinafter Smith, Mind the Gap]; Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1754, 1760−63 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property and Property Rules] 
(Smith argues that property rules form part of an exclusion strategy that decentralizes decision-
making.  Depending on the nature of the resource, this can result in lower costs, including 
information costs, as compared with liability rules, which require more centralized decision-
making.); Ellickson, supra note 10, at 1331 (noting that because owners of small parcels are likely 
to have better knowledge of their land than others, negotiations between neighbors over a matter 
affecting both parcels will take place between well-informed parties). 
 27. Hayek, Use of Knowledge, supra note 8, at 521, 524−25. 
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functions as a kind of distillation of knowledge about local circumstances in 
many different settings.  The price of wheat may be going up because of weather 
events on the other side of the world, for example.  But the farmer does not need 
to know anything about those events, other than what the price signal tells her, 
namely, to grow more wheat if she can.  According to Hayek, prices in a market 
economy thus work to coordinate the actions of many different parties, each 
acting on their own specific local knowledge.28 
The argument put forward in this article is both simpler and broader in its 
application than previous arguments about local knowledge and market-based 
coordination.  Delegating decision-making powers to parties with local 
knowledge is not just useful as a means of facilitating coordination in a market 
economy.  Property rights channel local knowledge into decisions about 
resources in many contexts that are not linked to market-based transactions.  
These include many of the decisions made by families about the resources they 
control, such as the family home, as well as resource-based decisions made by 
cultural, religious, and charitable groups.29  Being able to rely upon local 
knowledge to make decisions about a resource is important, regardless of 
whether those decisions interact with a market.  In other words, the knowledge 
function of property rights is more fundamental, and generally applicable, than 
the market-oriented role that Hayek and others emphasize.30 
The knowledge-channeling function of property depends on systemic features 
of a property regime, including the decentralization of decision-making 
authority.  It is obviously not the case that every decision made by an owner is 
informed by difficult-to-acquire local knowledge, nor is it true that every aspect 
of property law doctrine privileges local knowledge.  Yet as Henry Smith has 
emphasized, when dealing with a complex system with emergent properties, like 
 
 28. Id. at 526. 
 29. On the use of property in land as a basis for collective self-government by cultural groups, 
see Lavoie, Collective Self-Government, supra note 25. 
 30. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT, supra note 26, at 33−37.  The knowledge-channeling 
function of property in non-market contexts may be implicit in some of Hayek’s discussion of 
customary norms and the development of the common law, though his focus is very much on 
property’s role in facilitating coordination in a market economy.  Hayek emphasizes how property 
rights secure legitimate expectations, which in turn facilitates interpersonal coordination.  
According to Hayek, rules based on exclusive rights to resources are general and predictable in 
their application, which serves to facilitate individual planning based on legitimate expectations 
about the conduct of other parties.  For example, Party A, the owner of Blackacre, is able to predict 
how Party B, a non-owner, will act in relation to Blackacre.  The value of local knowledge in non-
market-facing decision-making is arguably implicit in Hayek’s work, though to my knowledge it 
is never something he notes explicitly.  For instance, on pages 108−09 of HAYEK, LLL VOL 1, 
supra note 26, he writes: 
The maximal certainty of expectations which can be achieved in a society in which 
individuals are allowed to use their knowledge of constantly changing circumstances for 
their equally changing purposes is secured by rules which tell everyone which of these 
circumstances must not be altered by others and which he himself must not alter. 
See HAYEK, LLL VOL 1, supra note 26, at 85−88, 106−10. 
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a property regime, it is an error to assume that the attributes of the system as a 
whole will be reflected in each of the constituent parts.31  The argument here is 
that property as a system channels local knowledge into decisions about 
resources, and that it may do so in a manner that is more effective than 
alternative resource management approaches.  In making this argument, 
however, the article does attempt to link some of the basic content of property 
law—including the agenda-setting authority of owners, principles of possession 
and accession, and the law governing future interests—with these systemic 
features of property.32 
The argument that follows is distinct from arguments that address the ways 
that property systems manage their own internal complexity and associated 
information costs.33  Rather than seeking to explain how property systems 
manage the legal complexity they give rise to, this article addresses the more 
basic question of how property systems deal with the fact that effective decision-
making about physical resources often requires access to local knowledge 
specific to the time and place in which those resources are situated.  While 
property systems create legal complexity that must be managed, they also help 
solve knowledge-based challenges due to the complexity of the physical world 
and of human societies.  These challenges could be intractable under alternative 
resource management regimes.  I argue that property as an institution helps to 
address the challenges of decision-making about physical resources in a world 
in which local knowledge can matter a great deal. 
This article proceeds in three parts.  In the first part, I explain what local 
knowledge is, why it tends to be widely dispersed and difficult to acquire, and 
why it presents a challenge for centralized decision-making structures.34  In the 
second part, I outline a justification for property rights based on local 
knowledge.35  I argue that by decentralizing decision-making about physical 
resources, property rights channel local knowledge into decisions about those 
resources.  This in turn leads to better decisions and better outcomes than would 
otherwise be possible, according to a range of possible criteria.  In the third part, 
I argue that the knowledge-channeling function of property helps explain 
important features of existing common law property systems.36  I argue that the 
theory presented here reinforces a leading descriptive account of property, 
 
 31. Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 26, at 969−71. 
 32. In this sense, it may fit within a broader research agenda that links internal and external 
approaches to private law.  See Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing Up Private Law, 70 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 489 (2020). 
 33. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, 
Optimal Standardization]; Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1691 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Law of Things]. 
 34. See infra Section I. 
 35. See infra Section II. 
 36. See infra Section III. 
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according to which the essential characteristic of ownership is the owner’s 
exclusive authority to set the agenda for the resource.37  If owners are often best 
positioned to acquire vital local knowledge about their resources, then it makes 
sense that property rights delegate to those owners the exclusive authority to 
make important decisions about them.  In this section, I also argue that the local 
knowledge function of property rights helps explain the role of possession, the 
principle of accession, and rules that limit the control of past owners over 
resources.38 
My focus in this article is on property rights in physical resources, including 
land and tangible personal property, but not including intangible resources, such 
as intellectual property.  Knowledge linked to a physical context cannot have the 
same significance for resources that do not have a physical presence.  The fact 
that local knowledge does not have the same significance for rights to non-
physical resources may have implications for how such rights ought to be 
understood and under what circumstances they are justified.  However, that issue 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 
A.  What Is Local Knowledge? 
What is local knowledge, exactly?  Broadly speaking, it can be understood as 
any knowledge to which parties have privileged access by virtue of their 
proximity to a physical place or thing, or their engaging in an activity involving 
the place or thing.  Local knowledge stands in contrast to other forms of 
knowledge that are not as dependent on physical context.  For instance, James 
Scott, following Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, draws a distinction 
between “abstract” knowledge and “metis,” meaning knowledge embedded in 
local experience.39  Hayek had previously drawn a quite similar distinction 
between “scientific” knowledge, on the one hand, and “knowledge of the 
particular circumstances of time and place,” on the other.40  This distinction is a 
key starting point for understanding local knowledge. 
For Hayek, scientific knowledge refers to knowledge of the phenomena of the 
physical world, and particularly those that can be accurately predicted according 
to general physical rules.41  Trained experts are often in a better position to 
understand and apply scientific knowledge than parties who are close to a place, 
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thing, or activity.  The physician who has reviewed test results is often better 
able to predict the likely future course of an illness than the patient who is 
experiencing it directly.  The engineer with appropriate data before her is often 
in a better position to know how to build a bridge, even in a location she has 
never actually been to, than an untrained person who is intimately familiar with 
the location of the proposed bridge or who has performed manual labor on 
bridges in the past.  With respect to scientific knowledge, proximity to a place 
or thing, or involvement in an activity, is often not particularly crucial.  But not 
all knowledge is scientific knowledge. 
The privileged epistemic position of the expert applies only in circumstances 
in which general rules have predictive power.42  This is often not the case in 
complex, open systems with many interacting variables, nor is it the case where 
relevant variables are either unknown or are contingent on circumstances that 
are uncertain.43  A great deal of useful knowledge is not “scientific” in character.  
With respect to non-scientific knowledge, a distant expert is usually at a distinct 
disadvantage as compared to a party with first-hand experience of a place, thing, 
or activity.  Hayek provides the following explanation: 
We need to remember only how much we have to learn in any 
occupation after we have completed our theoretical training, how big 
a part of our working life we spend learning particular jobs, and how 
valuable an asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local 
conditions, and special circumstances.  To know of and put to use a 
machine not fully employed, or somebody’s skill which could be 
better utilized, or to be aware of a surplus stock which can be drawn 
upon during an interruption of supplies, is socially quite as useful as 
the knowledge of better alternative techniques.  And the shipper who 
earns his living from using otherwise empty or half-filled journeys of 
tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose whole knowledge is almost 
exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or the arbitrageur who 
gains from local differences of commodity prices, are all performing 
eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of 
circumstances of the fleeting moment not known to others.44 
Hayek’s focus is on how markets can bring about effective coordination of 
the activities of different parties in an economy, each with their own distinct 
local knowledge.45  As a result, his examples emphasize knowledge of 
circumstances that can inform market transactions, such as arbitrage 
opportunities.46  But the epistemic point is actually more general than that.  
Dispersed knowledge linked to parties’ proximity to a place or thing, or 
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involvement in an activity, is ubiquitous.47  It includes potentially useful 
knowledge that either does not have immediate relevance to a market transaction 
or that a party may not be inclined to exploit for market purposes.  However, 
even if local knowledge does not inform a market transaction, a property owner 
may still be able to use that knowledge to inform decision-making about the 
resource.  For instance, a family making decisions about how to use the space in 
their home will draw on their knowledge of the physical attributes of the home 
and the characteristics of the family members, even if these decisions are not 
linked to markets.  Similarly, cultural, religious, and charitable organizations 
draw on the local knowledge of members in making decisions about the use of 
resources in their communities, again without necessarily engaging with the 
market. 
A key feature of local knowledge is that it tends to be widely dispersed and 
difficult for a central authority to aggregate, process, and act upon.48  The 
property owners in a city, for instance, have a dispersed body of knowledge 
about the land and buildings they own, including, for example: What are the 
potential uses for the building?  Where does water tend to accumulate in the 
yard?  Which rooms are drafty?  Will the furnace likely need to be replaced 
soon?  How do you access the attic?  How is the furniture best arranged?  How 
are the bedrooms best allocated?  What kinds of renovations are feasible?  What 
kinds of renovations might be worthwhile, either for current occupants or 
prospective future occupants?  What norms govern relations with the neighbors?  
Similarly, farmers in a rural community are often best positioned to answer such 
questions as: When should seeds be planted on a particular field in light of recent 
weather conditions?  What crops are suitable in a given year in light of the soil 
conditions?  What is the best order in which to harvest crops on different fields, 
given the potential weather, the available labor force, and the state of the crops? 
Decisions about residential home improvement provide a relatable example 
that underscores the importance of dispersed local knowledge.  Homeowners are 
constantly formulating lists of possible home improvement projects.  These 
projects need to be prioritized, based on factors that include the skills of the 
homeowner (i.e., what she can do herself), the homeowner’s available time and 
inclination to devote that time to home improvement, the homeowner’s available 
financial resources and inclination to devote those resources to home 
improvement, the problems experienced by occupants of the home that would 
be solved by a given home improvement project, the needs and preferences of 
the current occupants of the home, and the potential needs and preferences of 
future occupants of the home (which may affect the home’s resale value).  
Seemingly prosaic decisions, like whether to replace the front window or instead 
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enlarge a closet in a bedroom, can rely on local knowledge held by the occupants 
of the home and no one else. 
It would not be practically possible for a centralized authority to acquire all 
the local knowledge currently held by owners.  For one thing, the time and 
expense might be too great.  But even if a great deal of resources were 
marshalled, the task would still likely be impossible.49  Much of this local 
knowledge is subject to constant change.50  The physical properties of a resource 
and the surrounding context are not static.  A building might have previously 
been optimally used as a warehouse, but it is now better off being turned into 
lofts.  The furnace might be showing signs of slowing down, necessitating a 
costly repair in the near future.  A new child might have been born to the family 
occupying a house, making it desirable to add a bedroom.  The recent weather 
and soil conditions in a given field in the spring may caution against what would 
normally be a suitable crop to sow.  The constantly changing nature of relevant 
local knowledge makes it difficult for all but those close to the resource to have 
an up-to-date understanding of it.  Incidentally, this is a fact that is generally 
taken for granted in the insurance industry, which depends on owners’ legal 
duties to disclose relevant information about insured property, and even then, 
must account for the problem of adverse selection due to owners’ superior 
knowledge of the risks facing their property.51 
Another problem for attempts to centralize decision-making is that some local 
knowledge is tacit knowledge, meaning it cannot be effectively communicated 
to a third party lacking the relevant context or experience.52  A farmer may know 
intuitively from experience that a tilling technique would be unsuitable for a 
particular field, without necessarily being able to communicate why.  Similarly, 
a traditional hunter may have a sense of where game will be located in light of 
the recent weather, without being able to articulate the reason in terms of cause 
and effect.  And a longtime homeowner, with a feel for the layout of a house and 
the habits of those who live in it, may have a sense of how a kitchen should be 
set up after a renovation.  The cumulative body of tacit local knowledge about a 
resource can be quite significant, putting centralized decision-makers at a further 
disadvantage as compared with those on the ground. 
It is important to emphasize that relevant local knowledge is not limited to 
knowledge about the physical properties of resources.  Locally held knowledge 
about the people who are likely to interact with a resource can be just as 
important to effective decision-making.  This knowledge can similarly be 
difficult, or in some cases, impossible, for centralized decision-makers to 
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acquire and act upon.  The needs and preferences of those who are likely to use 
the resource are one example.  A business owner familiar with a neighborhood 
may be aware of the unmet demand of potential customers in that neighborhood, 
just as a homeowner may be aware of changes to the home that would suit the 
preferences of those currently living in the home or who are likely to live there 
in the future.  Knowledge about local norms can also be important to resource-
based decision-making.  For instance, certain kinds of activities may be likely to 
give rise to conflicts with neighbors, which can be costly.  Parties who are 
embedded in a local community are in a much better position to account for such 
local norms in their decisions.  Knowledge about local needs, preferences, and 
norms differs from knowledge about physical properties of resources in many 
ways.  Yet these forms of knowledge often share the key attributes of being 
highly dispersed within society and difficult for centralized authorities to 
account for in making decisions. 
An exhaustive categorization of forms of local knowledge may not be 
possible.  However, one can identify a number of different categories: 1) 
knowledge about the physical characteristics of the resource; 2) knowledge 
about local conditions relevant to the use of the resource; 3) knowledge about 
the needs and preferences of those who are likely to use the resource; 4) 
knowledge about complementary resources that can be used in connection with 
the physical resource; 5) knowledge about activities or processes that enhance 
the use of the resource; and 6) knowledge about local norms relevant to the use 
of the resource in human society.  With respect to each of these categories, it 
will often be the case that a party close to the resource or involved in activities 
related to the resource will be in a privileged epistemic position relative to 
outsiders, even outside experts.  The specific relevance of this insight to 
justifying and understanding property rights is explored in greater detail below. 
B.  Local Knowledge and Organizations 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to acknowledge the role of 
organizations in decision-making about resources.  Many resources are managed 
by organizations consisting of multiple individuals with their own internal 
decision-making processes.  Examples include business firms, charities, and 
families.  Decisions about resources owned by an organization are not 
necessarily made by the members of the organization with the most immediate 
local knowledge about the resource.  For instance, employees of a business 
might have greater local knowledge about a building than the CEO who ends up 
making a final decision about it.  Acquiring, processing, and acting upon local 
knowledge is a major challenge for organizations, a challenge that typically 
becomes greater with the size and complexity of the organization.53  However, 
the local knowledge advantages of decentralized decision-making can 
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sometimes be outweighed by other benefits associated with having a larger 
organization.  These include reducing transaction costs and taking advantage of 
economies of scale.54  Organizations may also be better at acting on what Hayek 
called “scientific” knowledge produced by experts.55  To the extent that such 
knowledge is important to the activity in question—such as, for instance, 
building a nuclear reactor—a more centralized organizational structure may be 
favored. 
It is possible for well-structured organizations to adopt internal processes to 
encourage the communication of relevant local knowledge to those making 
decisions.  This will be easiest to achieve in cases where decision-makers share 
the same context and background information as those with local knowledge.56  
That said, it will typically not be possible for centralized decision-makers within 
an organization to take account of all local knowledge that is available to those 
on the ground.57 
The local-knowledge costs of centralization may differ across activities.  
Some activities, such as farming, may rely particularly heavily on local 
knowledge, and so may be resistant to centralized administration, while for other 
activities, such as operating a general retail business, the costs may be more 
modest relative to the benefits of a larger organization.58  In each case, however, 
the benefits of centralization must be weighed against the costs, which include 
a reduced capacity to channel local knowledge into decision-making.  These 
costs and benefits can change over time.  For instance, it may be that the optimal 
scale of certain kinds of farming operations is increasing due to changes in 
technology and the labor market.59  Yet the ability to channel local knowledge 
of physical conditions into decisions remains an important factor in the success 
of agricultural operations, and one that tends to limit their scale.60  Firm 
ownership in primary agricultural production remains highly decentralized 
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compared with most other industries, in part due to the importance of local 
knowledge.61 
All of this is simply to say that while local knowledge is important, it is not 
the only thing that matters in decision-making about resources.  While local 
knowledge tends to favor decentralized decision-making, including through the 
mechanism of property rights, it does not necessarily follow that decision-
making should be decentralized to the greatest extent possible.  There is an 
important role for hierarchically structured organizations, even if their ability to 
process and act upon relevant local knowledge tends to diminish with the size of 
the organization.  However, while decentralizing decision-making to take 
advantage of local knowledge involves tradeoffs with other variables, 
approaches that centralize control over all of a society’s resources within a single 
organization appear highly prone to decision failures.62 
C.  Local Knowledge and “Big Data” 
It has recently been suggested that the advent of powerful computers, large 
data sets, and advanced techniques for interpreting data has diminished the 
importance of local knowledge, expanding the realm of technical and expertise-
driven forms of decision-making.63  In at least some areas, the significance of 
local knowledge has clearly been diminished by expert data analysis.  For 
instance, drivers’ knowledge about the best routes to take on local roads has been 
largely, if not entirely, rendered irrelevant by navigation software on 
smartphones that analyzes immense troves of data relating to travel time.64 
Another area in which data analysis has displaced local knowledge, to at least 
some degree, is in retailing.  Crafting a retail environment has always been a 
subtle activity that draws upon the practical knowledge and experience of those 
working in the business.65  However, increasingly sophisticated, data-based 
“scientific” knowledge on questions like how best to lay out a store or what 
products to stock has led to reduced reliance on local knowledge.66  Whereas in 
the past those working in retail businesses might have relied on their intuitions 
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or past experiences in predicting demand for a given product at a given price, 
today such businesses are much more likely to rely on statistical analysis of 
consumer data.67  However, it would be premature to suggest that decentralizing 
control of resources to take advantage of local knowledge is no longer necessary, 
and that centralized control of resources by large, data-driven organizations is 
the way of the future. 
Even for decisions where good data is available, data analysis may not be able 
to fully replace decision-making by those with relevant local knowledge.  For 
one thing, data analysis is always based on information about past events, but 
circumstances are always changing.  When a change in circumstances occurs for 
which no past precedent exists, data analysis will necessarily have limited 
predictive power.  When a completely new product is introduced, for instance, 
demand for that product may be genuinely uncertain, in the sense of not being 
calculable based on existing information.68  In these cases, dispersed knowledge 
may be important in guiding decision-making, and this may include a business 
owner’s understanding of how the new product will potentially fit with the day-
to-day lifestyles of his customers.  Similarly, in agriculture, climate change may 
mean that past data on weather and soil conditions has less predictive power and 
that more reliance must be placed on the lived experience of farmers who have 
seen the effects of those changes first-hand. 
When relevant formal data is not available, local knowledge continues to be 
important to the many decisions an owner must make.  These include decisions 
that depend on factors that are too specific to a particular context to be properly 
informed by data derived from other settings.  For instance, “big data” on its 
own is seldom going to be determinative in many decisions faced by 
homeowners, such as whether it makes more sense to renovate the kitchen or 
add a bedroom.  Unless the owner plans to immediately put the house on the 
market, the factors informing a decision like that are likely specific to the home 
and its residents. 
Similarly, data on climate and soil may help to indicate that a particular crop 
could be suitable to a particular location, but there are a multitude of non-data-
based reasons why a farmer with local knowledge might decide not to grow the 
crop.  For instance, the farmer might decline to grow the crop based on his 
knowledge of the skill set of the local farm labor force.  James Scott identifies 
other factors that scientific agriculture has struggled to account for, including 
the needs of family and community, “long-term soil structure, ecological 
diversity, and sustainability.”69  In each of these areas, the knowledge of those 
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with local experience may be vital to effective decision-making, and may help 
explain the remarkable persistence of owner-operated family farms.70  While 
“big data” has expanded the domain of technical decision-making, the realm of 
local knowledge is still quite extensive. 
II.  LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A.  How Property Channels Local Knowledge 
The essence of the local knowledge argument is that property rights devolve 
decision-making authority to parties who either have local knowledge or who 
are well-positioned to acquire it.  In other words, property rights tend to unite 
both decision-making authority over a resource and local knowledge about that 
resource in the same person.  It is reasonably clear that property rights confer a 
range of decision-making powers on owners.71  The other half of the equation, 
though, requires some explanation.  There are several features of property rights 
that lead owners to occupy a privileged position in terms of the local knowledge 
they have about a resource. 
First of all, existing property owners tend to have the opportunity to acquire 
local knowledge.72  Since an owner typically has rights to access and use a 
resource, she has the opportunity both to achieve physical proximity to the 
resource and to engage in activities with the resource.73  Physical proximity and 
engaging in activities with a resource are two key mechanisms for acquiring 
local knowledge.  A person who spends time on a parcel of land, for instance, is 
likely to acquire information about local conditions and the physical 
characteristics of the land.  The same person is even more likely to acquire such 
information if he is actively using the resource in some way.  And so, the special 
opportunities an owner has to use and occupy a resource help to explain the 
owner’s acquisition of local knowledge. 
But perhaps just as significant as the opportunities owners have to acquire 
local knowledge are the incentives that lead them to acquire such knowledge.  
These incentives stem from property owners’ right to derive benefits from the 
property, including benefits of use, income derived from the property, and 
increases in value.  Owners may attempt to directly acquire local knowledge 
about the resource, so as to be better able to derive benefits from it.  However, 
owners also have incentives to use the resource in ways that lead indirectly to 
the acquisition of local knowledge.  For instance, in the course of running a 
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business in a building, a business owner may incidentally learn of ways the 
building could be more effectively laid out. 
The incentive dimension of local knowledge acquisition means that even 
where an owner does not have relevant local knowledge about the resource at 
the outset of her tenure as owner, she is likely to acquire it.  Someone who 
recently bought a resource, or who received it as a gift, may not currently have 
relevant local knowledge, but such a party is immediately subject to incentives 
to try to learn about the resource and to engage in activities that may lead 
incidentally to the acquisition of knowledge. 
The range of decisions that a property owner can make about resources that 
are informed by local knowledge is quite extensive.  They include decisions 
about whether to use the resource, and if so, how.  A farmer’s decision about 
whether to let a field lie fallow, or to grow wheat or barley, would fit this 
description.  Another example would be a decision about whether to give access 
or control to some other party for a temporary period, and if so, to whom.  For 
instance, the owner of a business may entrust a delivery truck to an employee, 
or the owner of a building may choose a tenant.  In the case of freely transferable 
resources, relevant decisions might also include a decision about whether to sell 
or give the resource away, and if so, to whom.  Local knowledge could inform 
the timing of the sale and the identity of the recipient, among other factors. 
Importantly, the kinds of decisions that can be informed by local knowledge 
include both market-facing decisions and non-market-facing decisions.  An 
owner may choose to use a resource to produce something for sale or choose to 
sell the resource itself.  However, an owner can also draw on local knowledge 
in ways that improve decision-making without involving the market.  Such 
decisions would include a choice to use the resource for the benefit of the owner, 
the owner’s family and friends, or the wider community.  The allocation of space 
within a family home, or the dedication of a building for use as a community 
hall are examples.74  Gratuitous transfers of resources, for instance to family 
members or charities, either inter vivos or through a will, can also be informed 
by knowledge of the resource or the recipient.  These non-market-facing 
decisions involve significant amounts of resources, even within modern market 
economies.75  And so, while arguments based on the role of property in 
channeling local knowledge have historically been linked to defenses of the 
market, such arguments are in fact not contingent on markets.  Indeed, local 
knowledge can be particularly significant with respect to managing resources 
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that are inalienable and thus kept out of the market, such as lands held by 
Indigenous communities.76 
The argument that property rights channel local knowledge into decisions 
about resources is subject to two important qualifications.  Firstly, the argument 
describes a systemic feature of property systems, not a hard-and-fast rule about 
the ownership of every resource.  It is obviously not the case that property 
owners always have more local knowledge about a resource than anyone else.  
The recent buyer of a home knows much less about it than the seller who grew 
up in the home, for example.  The absentee business owner knows less about the 
building in which a business operates than a dedicated long-time employee.  
However, even in cases like these, property rights do provide mechanisms to 
address owners’ knowledge gaps.  In the first example, the new homeowner is 
going to have opportunities and incentives to acquire knowledge over time, 
especially if she lives in the home.  In the second example, the absentee business 
owner may face financial incentives either to become better informed and 
acquire the knowledge relevant to running the business, or else to sell the 
business to someone who will do so.  A prospective new owner willing to acquire 
local knowledge would presumably be able to operate the business more 
profitably than the absentee owner.  Accordingly, the prospective owner would 
be willing to pay more for it than the present value placed on it by the absentee 
owner. 
However, even if the property system does not effectively confer ownership 
on the most knowledgeable parties all the time, it may still serve a knowledge 
function at a systemic level.  Property systems display systemic complexity, in 
the sense that the emergent properties of the system as a whole are not readily 
reducible to the properties of the constituent parts.77  One consequence of 
complexity is that it is not necessarily appropriate to assume that the properties 
of the system as a whole will always be reflected in the properties of the 
constituent parts, and vice versa.78  Water is composed of water molecules but 
“wetness” is an emergent property of water that is not present at the level of 
individual water molecules.79  Similarly, characteristics that one might desire in 
a property system might be present at the level of the system as a whole, even if 
they are not always identifiable in particular rules, decisions, or transactions 
within the system.80  Channeling local knowledge into decisions about resources 
is a product of the systemic features of a property rights regime, including in 
particular, its distribution of decision-making authority.  Property rights 
decentralize decision-making in a way that makes it more likely that any given 
decision-maker will have relevant local knowledge.  But property rights do not 
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guarantee that in every particular instance the party making a decision will have 
the best access to local knowledge. 
The second qualification is that local knowledge is not the only factor relevant 
to a functioning property system.  Other important considerations include costs 
of administration, costs associated with risk and uncertainty, and transaction 
costs.  It would not make sense, for instance, to make ownership legally 
contingent on the owner’s having local knowledge about the resource.  A 
property regime that constantly reallocated rights to parties who could show that 
they had the best local knowledge about a given resource would be 
dysfunctional.  Such a hypothetical regime would be costly to administer, would 
create uncertainty for property owners, and would impede mutually beneficial 
transactions.  To say that property systems are justified in part by the function 
they serve in channeling local knowledge into decisions about resources is not 
to say that this is the only factor relevant to the structure of a property system.  
Local knowledge is important and helps explain and justify the broad contours 
of property law, but it is not everything. 
Similarly, while it is possible to decentralize decision-making without 
property rights, the costs associated with alternative decentralization strategies 
mean they are unpromising as full-scale alternatives, rather than complements, 
to property.  For instance, decentralization can be achieved through the 
delegation of decision-making authority within a large organization.  This can 
make sense as a resource management strategy in some cases, due to economies 
of scale or the ability of a larger organization to minimize transaction costs.  
However, attempting to manage all of a society’s resources through the 
delegation of control powers from a centralized authority would involve costs 
that could be prohibitive, at least if those control powers were not linked to other 
traditional incidents of property.  A party with delegated control powers, but not 
the right to derive benefits from a resource, for instance, would have limited 
incentives to use the resource effectively.  By delegating not just the power to 
control resources, but also other associated incidents, property systems allow for 
decentralization while limiting the costs associated with doing so, including the 
incentive costs associated with dividing control from other traditional incidents 
of property. 
Even subject to these important qualifications, channeling local knowledge 
provides a compelling justification for property rights.  The argument constitutes 
a justification for property, rather than a mere description of collateral benefits 
associated with property, since it provides a compelling normative account that 
fits the core content of property as a legal institution.  As discussed in greater 
detail below, the local knowledge argument explains some of the most basic and 
generally applicable features of property, including an owner’s authority to set 
the agenda for a resource.81  While the local knowledge argument is contingent 
on empirical premises regarding the challenges associated with accounting for 
 
 81. See infra Part II.D. 
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local knowledge, these challenges are enduring features of the human experience 
in managing physical resources. 
The local knowledge justification for property can be summed up as follows: 
Property owners tend to have relevant local knowledge about resources.  And 
property rights, in turn, confer decision-making authority on owners that is 
immune in important ways from outside interference.  This decision-making 
authority puts owners in a position to make decisions that are informed by local 
knowledge that is not available to others.  To the extent that local knowledge is 
relevant to informing decisions about a physical resource, as it often is, 
conferring decision-making authority on parties with such knowledge can lead 
to better decisions and better outcomes than would otherwise be possible. 
B.  Knowledge and Consequences 
The claim that property rights lead to better decisions by channeling local 
knowledge is, ultimately, a consequentialist argument.  A decision made by a 
party with local knowledge will tend to be “better” than one made by a party 
without such knowledge, in the sense that it will bring about consequences that 
are superior to the alternatives.  According to what metric are the consequences 
superior?  In principle, arguments can be advanced based on a range of values, 
including familiar grounds based on welfare maximization or human flourishing.  
Better decisions could mean decisions that bring about consequences more 
aligned with satisfying individuals’ subjective preferences,82 or alternatively, 
with some more objective and less relativistic understanding of the conditions 
of human flourishing.83  If local knowledge improves an owner’s ability to 
achieve desired ends, then it can in principle allow for better decisions according 
to whatever criteria inform the owner’s decision-making, subject to institutional 
constraints that limit the permissible conduct of owners. 
It is important to acknowledge here that decision-making about resources 
involves several components, of which the knowledge held by the decision-
maker is only one––albeit a crucial one.  In addition to knowledge, decisions are 
also informed by the values and preferences of the decision-maker, as well as 
institutional constraints, such as those that serve to limit externalities.  The most 
prominent consequentialist justifications for property rights tend to focus on 
these latter aspects of decision-making, while mostly taking knowledge and 
information for granted.  On these accounts, property rights internalize the costs 
and benefits of activities, which tends to align owners’ incentives with what is 
socially optimal.84  Property rights provide incentives to work, produce, 
improve, and avoid the overuse of resources, and thus to bring about desirable 
consequences.  A party with self-seeking preferences can be led to use a resource 
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efficiently through property rights that ensure she can exclude others and keep 
the product of her labor.85 
This article has sought to emphasize that the knowledge held by the decision-
maker is crucial to effective decision-making, but that does not mean that these 
other components of decision-making can be ignored.  The incentives to work, 
produce, improve, and avoid the overuse of resources created by exclusive 
property rights are important in many contexts.  Similarly, laws that limit 
externalities, such as the tort of nuisance or land use regulations, can be 
appropriate, even if one acknowledges the importance of local knowledge. 
These other components of decision-making also have implications for 
arguments that seek to justify property rights on the basis of local knowledge.  
Specifically, a knowledge-based argument for property must explain how it is 
that decisions made according to the diverse values and preferences of particular 
owners will ultimately lead to consequences that are viewed as desirable from 
the point of view of society as a whole.  On its own, the argument that property 
channels local knowledge leading to better decision-making is subject to a major 
limitation: an owner’s decision will only take account of the owner’s values and 
preferences, not those of non-owners.  And so, while an owner may be in a 
position to make a better-informed decision than anyone else, that decision will 
not necessarily be the best one for everyone.  For instance, a landowner 
committed to conservation might decide to leave land in its natural state, without 
taking into account the interests of people who need housing that could be built 
on that land.  Alternatively, an owner might choose to build a mega-mansion for 
herself on the land to use as a second home.  In both cases, the owner’s decision 
might fail to take account of the needs and interests of other people, even if the 
owner’s decision is informed by local knowledge. 
There are at least two possible ways to address the problem of ensuring that a 
property system is able to harness local knowledge in a way that serves the 
interests of a broad range of members of the society.  The first approach is to 
focus on the distribution of property rights.  One could require that the overall 
distribution of rights within the property system be such that each person has the 
opportunity to reflect her own values and priorities in decisions about resources.  
For instance, Jeremy Waldron has argued for property as a “general right,” 
meaning that every individual in a society ought to have the opportunity to 
pursue her desired ends through the exercise of property rights.86  This would in 
principle allow for each individual to bring his own values and priorities to bear 
in making decisions about resources, while at the same time tending to ensure 
that those making decisions have access to local knowledge about their 
resources.  Under such a property system, local knowledge can be effectively 
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channeled, while at the same time reflecting the interests of a broad range of 
members of society.87 
The other possible response to the challenge of ensuring that the property 
system serves a sufficiently broad range of interests is to rely on an appeal to 
markets.  One might argue that property rights, when combined with markets, 
can create the conditions for owners to use their local knowledge in a way that 
serves the interests of others, ultimately making both owners and non-owners 
better off.  That is essentially Hayek’s position.88  Where markets are in place, 
property owners are able to take account of their own local knowledge as well 
as the information they receive in the form of price signals about local conditions 
elsewhere.  This allows for a degree of economic coordination that would be too 
information-intensive to be achieved by a centralized authority.89  One could 
argue that the property system is a necessary part of a market economy that 
serves the interests of a broad range of parties, including those that do not 
themselves have significant property rights in physical resources.  And so, for 
instance, consumers benefit from the efficient allocation of resources by 
landowning farmers, in the form of low prices for food, regardless of whether 
those consumers themselves own land.  The argument is essentially that the 
rising tide of economic growth, fed in part by the local knowledge of property 
owners, eventually lifts all boats. 
While a justification for property based on local knowledge can rely on an 
appeal to markets, the argument can also depend, to at least some degree, on the 
distribution of property rights.  Owners are able to take advantage of local 
knowledge to achieve their ends to a degree that more centralized decision-
makers would not be able to achieve.  To the extent that the pursuit of those ends 
is justified in light of the values and interests of others in the society, then 
property rights can be justified as a useful and sometimes necessary means to 
achieving valued ends by uniting local knowledge and decision-making 
authority. 
The local knowledge justification for property rights is not inconsistent with 
other justifications, including those based on economic incentives to work, 
produce, improve, improve, and avoid the overuse of resources, as well as those 
based on moral rights to property.90  The justification set out above is in fact 
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broadly aligned with these approaches and can draw upon them to address 
concerns about the distribution of decision-making authority. 
C.  Local Knowledge and Ownership Concentration 
The capacity of a property system to channel local knowledge depends on the 
distribution of property rights in a society.  The knowledge function of property 
is best served when property rights decentralize decision-making authority over 
resources, allocating it to a dispersed pool of owners who are more likely to have 
access to relevant local knowledge.  When the ownership of resources is highly 
concentrated, it becomes less likely that owners will actually have relevant local 
knowledge about the resources they control.  The absentee owner of a vast swath 
of farmland, for instance, is arguably in no better position in terms of local 
knowledge than a central planning bureaucracy.  This caveat regarding 
ownership concentration is broadly consistent with at least some modern 
understandings of property.  Joseph Singer, for instance, has argued that some 
degree of dispersal of ownership is built into what it means to have a system of 
private property.91 
As discussed above, there are considerations other than local knowledge, such 
as minimizing transaction costs, that may explain the control of resources by 
larger organizations.92  The point at which the benefits of a larger organization 
are outweighed by the inability to act effectively on local knowledge is context-
dependent and difficult to assess as an empirical matter.  The degree of 
decentralized control, within a property system as a whole, that is necessary to 
best take advantage of local knowledge is also difficult to pinpoint empirically.  
However, if one acknowledges that one of the functions of a property system is 
to decentralize decision-making about resources, then there is presumably a 
point at which ownership concentration would become so great that the property 
system would no longer adequately serve that function.93 
The local knowledge justification for property rights thus comes with an 
important caveat regarding the distribution of property rights.  If ownership is 
unduly concentrated, then property rights do not, in fact, result in decentralized 
control over resources by parties more likely to have access to local knowledge.  
A single owner of a vast territory has fewer opportunities to acquire local 
knowledge about the land than would be the case if the land were divided into 
many smaller parcels, each with a separate owner. 
The claim that property systems are best able to channel local knowledge 
when ownership is dispersed within a society aligns with recent empirical work 
in development economics that establishes two key propositions: 1) secure 
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property rights are important institutional precursors for economic 
development,94 and 2) significant ownership concentration can hinder economic 
development.95 
The correlation between secure, formal, private property rights and high levels 
of economic development is quite strong.96  A large body of economic literature 
supports the importance of property rights to economic development, though the 
causal link is not straightforward.97  Property rights are arguably a necessary 
element of the institutional package that promotes economic development, even 
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if they are seemingly not a sufficient condition for growth.98  One of the more 
recent empirical insights emphasizes the importance of “inclusive” institutions, 
including institutions that limit economic inequality, for economic growth.99  
Others have argued that property rights are most likely to promote growth when 
they are “generalized,” meaning they are open to all agents in the economy and 
not just a narrow subset.100 
Conventional explanations for the inverse relationship between inequality and 
growth include: the association between inequality and “extractive” or corrupt 
political institutions, limits on access to credit by those without significant 
property holdings, and enhanced gains from trade and incentive effects when 
ownership rights can be sold to a wider range of parties.101  However, the 
knowledge function of property may also help explain why property rights seem 
to work best where ownership concentration is limited.  Where ownership is 
highly concentrated, property rights are less effective at channeling local 
knowledge into decisions about resources.  In societies in which the ownership 
of resources is highly concentrated, resources are less likely to be owned by a 
party with access to relevant local knowledge about them.  Parties on the ground, 
such as the residents of a shantytown, may still acquire local knowledge, but 
they are prevented from effectively acting on it without a formally recognized 
property interest.102  In such cases, the property system denies decision-making 
authority to those with access to local knowledge, effectively the inverse of a 
knowledge-channeling property system with more broadly distributed property 
rights. 
Ownership concentration appears to be a particularly important factor for 
economic development in the agricultural sector.  In the mid-20th century, a 
number of countries, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, achieved high 
levels of growth in agricultural productivity following land reforms that 
significantly reduced the ownership concentration of arable land.103  These 
reforms have also been credited as a cause of the rapid growth and 
industrialization of these economies in the latter half of the 20th century.104  The 
associated productivity gains are often attributed to the improved incentives 
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agricultural workers face when they are cultivating their own land, and the 
difficulties associated with monitoring farmers.105  However, the enhanced 
ability of owner-cultivators to incorporate local knowledge into their decisions, 
including decisions to adopt technological innovations, may have also played a 
part. 
The association between ownership concentration and growth in agriculture 
is especially noteworthy.  Local knowledge is particularly important in the 
agricultural sector, where constantly changing factors specific to a particular 
place and time, such as soil conditions and weather, are so significant.106  It is 
therefore particularly difficult for those without first-hand experience of local 
conditions to make effective resource-management decisions in this sector.  The 
fact that ownership concentration seems especially significant to growth in a 
sector in which local knowledge is so important invites further investigation.  
The function of widely dispersed property rights in channeling local knowledge 
into decisions may be under-appreciated as a mechanism for growth by 
development economists.  This could be a fruitful topic for future empirical 
scholarship. 
D.  Property Institutions and Local Knowledge 
In principle, a wide range of property institutions can channel local 
knowledge.  The local knowledge argument can serve to justify both individual 
property rights as well as collective rights in common-pool resources managed 
by a defined group of people.  An individual owner of a resource is well-
positioned to learn about its localized features, but members of a group 
managing a resource can also acquire and act upon such knowledge under the 
right circumstances.  As long as group membership is limited and internal 
processes exist for sharing information and making collective decisions based 
on that information, a group ought to be able to channel local knowledge about 
a common-pool resource.  Indeed, existing literature on common-pool resources 
indicates that the management of such resources is most likely to succeed in 
cases involving either small groups or larger organizations that include smaller 
nested groups.107  These conditions help to ensure parties can effectively share 
information relevant to local conditions and act upon it.108 
The local knowledge argument for property is also consistent with a range of 
other doctrinal specifications that may accompany a property interest.  For 
instance, while the choice to alienate a resource is one important decision that 
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can be informed by local knowledge, alienability is not essential to the argument.  
A property owner without the power to alienate is still able to make other 
important decisions about the agenda for a resource that can be informed by local 
knowledge.  In cases where special considerations may motivate alienation 
restraints, such as with respect to Indigenous interests in land, the argument from 
local knowledge can still explain and help to justify the core characteristics of 
the interest, including the power of owners to make decisions about the use of 
the resource. 
Similarly, the local knowledge argument for property rights is consistent with 
restrictions on the use of a resource, as long as a sufficient degree of residual 
control rests with the owner.  A residential homeowner may not have the right 
to build a multi-story tower on his land, but he can still be empowered to act on 
local knowledge in many other significant ways.  Indeed, the success of urban 
communities may depend in part on institutions’ ability to take account of local 
knowledge, even if the density of these communities also means there are more 
likely to be spillover effects on neighbors that motivate land use restrictions. 
The urban theorist Jane Jacobs emphasized the pitfalls of seeking to impose 
development plans through top-down processes that fail to account for the 
existing diversity of uses.109  A thriving neighborhood typically includes a mix 
of homes and businesses suited to the needs and lifestyles of the residents, 
whereas one of the hallmarks of planned communities in the 20th century was a 
sterile separation of uses.110  Property rights are one of the key mechanisms that 
allow locals to act on their knowledge of life in the community in providing for 
a diverse set of land uses.  There may be good reasons to restrict certain uses.  
For instance, a new tower could conceivably disrupt the pattern of life in a 
neighborhood in detrimental ways.  However, the residual power of owners to 
make land-use decisions still plays an important role in channeling local 
knowledge.  Even if certain uses are restricted, the availability of a meaningful 
range of potential land uses allows owners to adapt to local conditions. 
Local knowledge arguments can justify property regimes in a number of 
different institutional settings in part because the argument is consistent with a 
range of complementary normative principles.  However, despite the 
adaptability of local knowledge arguments, there is one key requirement that 
must be satisfied.  A property system must provide a mechanism for recognizing 
the decision-making authority of a dispersed pool of owners.  If a resource 
management regime fails to decentralize decision-making authority in this way, 
then it is not likely to be capable of adequately channeling local knowledge into 
decisions about resources. 
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E.  Property and Subsidiarity 
There is a certain affinity between the local knowledge argument for property 
and the principle of “subsidiarity,” which holds that more centralized authorities 
should have a subsidiary function, performing tasks that cannot effectively be 
performed at a more local level.111  Originally derived from Catholic social 
thought, “subsidiarity” came to be adopted in the 20th century as a principle of 
European Union law.112  The concept has also proven influential in scholarship 
relating to federalism, international law, and environmental law.113  Indeed, the 
growing appreciation for the principle of subsidiarity in these fields has meant 
that the importance of local decision-making is today more often acknowledged 
in discussions of public law than it is with respect to property and private law. 
The classical justification for subsidiarity is based on moral agency and 
responsibility, as well as access to human goods associated with the exercise of 
agency.  The basic argument is that centralized authorities should not “absorb” 
their constituent local associations and members, but rather leave them space for 
meaningful action.114  People should not be reduced to cogs in a larger machine 
because doing so deprives them of agency and the human goods associated with 
contributing in a meaningful way to the decisions that affect them.115  Authority 
should rest at the most decentralized level that is effective—which could be a 
family, community association, or local government—not necessarily because 
these bodies will make “better” decisions, but rather because decentralized 
authority more fully respects the humanity of those subject to the decisions.116  
A traditional defense of property based on subsidiarity would thus emphasize 
the moral agency of those involved in decision-making, such as individual 
families and business owners, rather than the local knowledge they may be able 
to draw upon. 
A consequentialist argument for property based on the importance of local 
knowledge differs in important ways from the classical justification for 
subsidiarity.  My argument has been that the decentralized decision-making that 
property facilitates tends to be “better” than more centralized decision-making, 
in terms of the consequences for those affected by it.  This argument focuses on 
the informational content going into a decision and the resulting effects of the 
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decision, rather than the inherent value and human goods associated with 
participating meaningfully in a decision. 
While the local knowledge argument for property is clearly distinct from 
traditional accounts of the subsidiarity principle, these arguments do align in 
endorsing decentralized decision-making in the absence of countervailing 
justifications.  The local knowledge argument can thus readily be adapted as a 
supplementary justification for the principle of subsidiarity.  On this account, 
local decision-making should be preferred not just out of respect for human 
agency and the human goods associated with meaningful participation in 
decision-making, but also because local decision-makers are more likely to be 
able to draw upon valuable local knowledge relevant to the decision.117  Indeed, 
this local-knowledge-based reinforcement of the subsidiarity principle is 
relevant not just with respect to property, but also in the various public law 
domains in which subsidiarity is more commonly invoked.  Widely held 
property rights, like local government, can be viewed as a manifestation of the 
broader principle of subsidiarity, which in turn is justified on overlapping 
grounds which include the argument from local knowledge. 
III.  LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND PROPERTY LAW 
The local knowledge function of property rights helps to answer one of the 
most basic questions about property rights: why should we have this ubiquitous 
institution, as opposed to some other, more centralized approach to resource 
management?  But in addition to shedding light on the justification for property 
rights, the local knowledge function of property law can also help explain a 
number of basic doctrinal features of property law regimes.  Here I will focus on 
three elements: 1) the agenda-setting authority of owners; 2) the role of physical 
proximity to a resource under the concepts of possession and accession; and 3) 
the role of temporal proximity to a resource under doctrines that limit a past 
owner’s power to bind the decision-making authority of current owners. 
A.  Agenda-Setting Authority 
Larissa Katz has persuasively argued that the essential feature of property is 
the exclusive right of the owner to set the agenda for a resource.118  An owner’s 
exclusive agenda-setting position includes the authority to make decisions such 
as how the resource will be used and by whom.  Katz contrasts her account of 
the concept of property with the views of “boundary theorists,” who emphasize 
 
 117. The connection between subsidiarity and these kinds of local knowledge is occasionally 
made in public law.  See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 113, at 1378−79 (2004); Aurélian Portuese, 
The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231, 
236−37 (2011). 
 118. Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity, supra note 37, at 277−78. 
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the right to exclude as being the essential feature of the concept of property.119  
Her account also stands in contrast to those that allow for a broader range of 
essential features of property rights, such as the right to possess, the right to use, 
and the right to income, as well as accounts that hold property to be a purely 
conventional “bundle of rights” with no essential features.120  Katz defends her 
approach primarily in terms of its descriptive fit with existing property law 
doctrine.  Unlike the right to exclude, which sometimes must yield to other 
considerations, the right to set the agenda for a resource, at least as against other 
private parties, is present in virtually all circumstances in which property as a 
concept is invoked.  Moreover, other important rights, including the right to 
exclude, use, and possess can be understood as subsidiary to the right to set the 
agenda for the resource.121  Each of these subsidiary rights can assist the owner 
in her exercise of the over-arching right to set the agenda for the resource. 
The local knowledge function of property helps to reinforce the view that 
agenda-setting authority is indeed central to the concept of property.  The 
owner’s authority to set the agenda is the key doctrinal element necessary to 
allow owners to channel local knowledge into decisions about their resources.  
Property could not serve its knowledge-channeling function if owners were not 
empowered to act on their knowledge by making important decisions about their 
resources.  The agenda-setting authority of owners is thus central and necessary 
to the local knowledge function of property.  The same could not necessarily be 
said for other incidents of property ownership.  For instance, an owner without 
a right to exclude could still effectively channel local knowledge into decisions 
about the resource, as long as other agenda-setting powers were present.  Limits 
on the right to exclude from a quasi-public space like a shopping mall, for 
instance, would not necessarily deprive the owner of the right to set the agenda 
for the space by leasing out retail space and building inviting corridors and 
attractions, and those decisions could be grounded in local knowledge about the 
mall and its potential customers.122 
It must be acknowledged that exclusion and agenda-setting are closely 
connected.  An owner’s right to exclude implicitly protects an indefinite range 
of uses from which an owner can choose.123  At the same time, it is unlikely that 
a property system could effectively maintain owners’ agenda-setting authority 
in many settings without the right to exclude, at least as a baseline 
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presumption.124  Indeed, the right to exclude is often essential to the practical 
functioning of property systems.  From the point of view of channeling local 
knowledge into decisions, however, agenda-setting authority is conceptually 
necessary, while exclusion may only be a practical necessity in many cases. 
The argument from local knowledge provides a functionalist justification for 
property that closely fits the descriptive account of property as exclusive agenda-
setting authority.  In this sense, it may help to complete the agenda-setting 
account of property as a legal theory that both fits and justifies property.125  
There are other normative arguments that fit with the agenda-setting account of 
property, including an argument from individual autonomy that Katz herself 
makes: essentially, the agenda-setting authority of owners helps to create a 
sphere of autonomy for them.126  The account of property as channeling local 
knowledge can perhaps serve as a functionalist justificatory complement to 
Katz’s rights-based account grounded in individual autonomy. 
Indeed, this kind of overlap between rights-based and functionalist accounts 
of the law fits with a broader trend in private law theory.  One of the hallmarks 
of the so-called “new private law” is a growing understanding of the ways in 
which functionalist and rights-based accounts of private law converge in 
explaining and justifying private law doctrines.127  To the extent that there is 
overlap between an understanding of property based on channeling local 
knowledge and an understanding of property informed by individual autonomy 
considerations, this would seem to provide further evidence of the moral 
pluralism underlying private law doctrine. 
It is interesting to note that other consequentialist justifications for property, 
such as those based on internalizing costs and benefits, tend to point to the right 
to exclude as the essential feature of property.  Property creates incentives to 
work, produce, improve, and avoid the overuse of resources only to the extent 
that other parties can be excluded.  Exclusion is necessary to these arguments, 
whereas agenda-setting does not seem to be.  The incentive to sow today is only 
enhanced by property rights if one can exclude others from reaping in the future.  
Similarly, property only creates incentives to avoid the overuse of resources if 
one can exclude others from using the resource and thus internalize the long-
term benefits.  Setting the agenda for the resource does not obviously have the 
same significance to these arguments. 
 
 124. On the cost trade-offs associated with using governance rather than exclusions strategies 
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The truth may be that property is justified on a number of different, 
overlapping grounds, some of which point to exclusion as the essential doctrinal 
element and some of which point to agenda-setting.  The acknowledgment of 
moral pluralism underlying property may mean that the attempt to identify a 
single doctrinal feature as the essence of property is misguided.  From the 
restricted point of view of the argument from local knowledge, however, 
exclusive agenda-setting authority is the essential feature. 
B.  Proximity-Reinforcing Doctrines 
1.  Possession 
The knowledge function of property can also help explain the central role of 
the concept of possession in property law.  At common law, possession is 
presumptive evidence of ownership.128  Possession also serves to order the 
priority of competing claims, with earlier possession taking precedence over 
later possession.129  Perhaps most controversially, under the doctrine of adverse 
possession, continuous possession over a given period of time can give rise to a 
claim that can defeat the claim of the title holder.130  Scholars have argued that 
possession, including the doctrine of adverse possession, serves a range of 
functions that include: 1) incentivizing the productive use of resources, since 
parties in possession are more likely to be using resources productively;131 2) 
providing a signal to third parties as to who controls the resource and protecting 
third-party expectations that form based on that signal;132 and 3) helping to 
ensure that objects of property have owners setting their agenda.133 
The local knowledge function of property law provides an alternative way of 
understanding the significant role of possession in property law.  Essentially, 
possessors are more likely to have relevant knowledge about the resource than 
non-possessors, which means they are presumptively in a better position to make 
decisions about the resource than non-possessors.  Possessors of a resource have 
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physical proximity to the resource and are more likely to be engaged in activities 
with it, two of the key indicators of local knowledge.  Of course, the superior 
knowledge of parties in possession must be balanced against other factors, 
including the benefits of certainty of title and facilitating efficient transactions 
that come with having a concept of ownership that is distinct from possession.  
Nevertheless, the privileged epistemic position of parties in possession provides 
a basis for preferring their claims in the absence of evidence of superior title, as 
well as possibly for preferring the claim of a long-term possessor over that of an 
owner who has completely disengaged from the resource.  Parties in possession 
have better information, and are likely to make better decisions, and so there 
would have to be a good countervailing reason to allow someone else to claim 
the resource. 
Local knowledge is thus one of the ideas that helps explain the role of 
possession in property law.  Importantly, the local knowledge function of 
possession is not diminished or rendered obsolete in any way by reliance on 
written records, unlike some of the other functions of possession.  For instance, 
the signaling role of possession becomes much less significant when reliable 
title records are available, especially when records are guaranteed by public title 
registries.  When there are reliable title records, third parties, including potential 
purchasers or creditors, no longer have to rely on possession as a signal of likely 
ownership.  Rather, they can simply check the records.  The existence of land 
title registries is often cited as one of the main arguments for legal reforms that 
downgrade the importance of possession, including proposals to abolish adverse 
possession.134  Where registries are in place, reliance interests are arguably 
better served by protecting the rights of the registered owner, rather than long-
term possessors.  Indeed, most Canadian provinces with “Torrens” land title 
registries that guarantee registered interests have abolished adverse 
possession.135 
The trend in the law of adverse possession in the U.S. has also been towards 
greater emphasis on written records rather than actual possession.  Some states 
now require, as a precondition for an adverse possession claim, that an occupant 
have paid property taxes for the relevant time period or have entered into 
possession pursuant to a document or deed ostensibly granting title.136  These 
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approaches are consistent with the view that the function of possession is 
primarily one of signaling.  Under these reforms, adverse possession claims are 
limited to cases where other signals of ownership, such as deeds or tax records, 
are at least ambiguous. 
The local knowledge function of possession provides a note of caution with 
respect to proposals to diminish the legal significance of possession.  Property 
interests that are formally or effectively indefeasible, even against the claims of 
long-term adverse occupants, allow owners to disengage completely from their 
resource for long periods of time, without the risk of being replaced as the owner.  
There are, of course, other features of property rights that encourage active 
ownership, most notably the positive incentive to derive income and other 
benefits from the resource.  However, it should be concerning that recent trends 
undermine a doctrine that works to ensure that decision-makers are at least 
minimally engaged with resources they own.  Such reforms make it more likely 
that there will be absentee owners lacking relevant local knowledge about 
resources they have the formal power to control, while preventing the property 
system from conferring legal authority on long-term occupiers who would 
presumptively have significant accumulated local knowledge. 
2.  Accession 
The argument from local knowledge can also provide a compelling 
explanation for accession, a general principle of property law for allocating 
ownership of new resources, including newly discovered resources or newly 
salient resources.137  Under the principle of accession, ownership of a new 
resource is assigned to the owner of another resource prominently connected to 
the new resource.138  Accession may be conceptualized either as the acquisition 
of a resource by the original owner or, alternatively, as the delineation of the 
proper scope of the original owner’s claim as including (or not) the new or newly 
salient resource.139 
A recent article by Thomas Merrill argues that the principle of accession can 
explain a wide range of property law doctrines.140  The ownership of newborn 
animals is assigned to the owner of the mother.141  The ownership of crops is 
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assigned to the owner of the land.142  Under the doctrine of accretion, the owner 
of land bounded by water holds the title to land that is created by gradual changes 
in the water level or alluvial deposits.143  Under the doctrine of fixtures, the 
owner of land also owns chattels annexed to the land.144  Similarly, with respect 
to attached chattels, the owner of the larger or more valuable chattel generally 
holds title to the newly created whole.145  The owner of land has a claim to 
chattels that have been mislaid, buried, or stored on the land, subject to the 
interest of the true owner of the chattels.146  Merrill pushes the concept of 
accession beyond these core cases, arguing for instance that the ad coelum rule, 
according to which the owner of the surface presumptively holds title to airspace 
and subsurface minerals, is also a manifestation of accession.  On this way of 
thinking, newly discovered minerals or airspace that becomes useful to the 
surface owner can be understood as being assigned to the owner of the 
surface.147 
There are a number of possible explanations for the principle of accession.  It 
may lower information costs by providing a salient and intuitive solution to the 
question of the ownership of new resources.148  It is easy for third parties to 
understand that the ownership of a foal goes to the owner of the mare, for 
example.  Accession can also avoid some of the problems associated with other 
approaches to assigning ownership of new things, such as the principle of first 
possession.  For instance, the principle of first possession can give rise to 
wasteful “races” to be the first to possess, which is something that the principle 
of accession avoids.149  However, perhaps the most significant benefit of 
accession is that it assigns ownership to parties who are likely to be competent 
owners.  The owner of a resource prominently connected to a new resource is 
likely to have access to the new resource, as well as access to capital to improve 
it.150  In many cases, though, the main reason that the owner is particularly likely 
to be competent will be the local knowledge she holds by virtue of already 
owning a closely connected resource.151 
The owner of a connected resource is likely to have a body of knowledge 
relevant to using and managing the resource in that context.  The owner of a 
farm is likely to know what to do with the crops growing on it.  If the farm is 
bounded by a river, the owner is likely to know how to put new land created by 
alluvial deposits to good use.  The owner of a boat hull is likely to know what to 
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do with the finished yacht built from the hull.152  The owner of land is likely to 
know how to use and manage a house built on the land, including the associated 
fixtures.  The owner of the surface of the land is likely to know how to use the 
airspace above the land up to a reasonable height, typically for building up from 
the surface.  Incidentally, it should be acknowledged that the owner of the 
surface may know very little about mining for the minerals below.  The local 
knowledge explanation for accession in the case of minerals does not seem to 
hold.  This may help explain why in many jurisdictions outside of the United 
States the ownership of minerals is presumptively held by the state and not the 
surface owner.153 
Local knowledge is not the only possible justification for the principle of 
accession.  However, in many contexts involving physical resources, it is 
arguably the most compelling one.  Merrill has argued that the principle of 
accession is “ubiquitous” in the law of property.154  Its ubiquity may in part 
reflect the importance of the local knowledge held by owners to a well-
functioning property system. 
C.  Temporal Proximity: Future Interests, Alienation Restraints, and the 
Numerus Clausus Principle 
A range of doctrines work to limit the control of resources by past owners.  
These include the rule against perpetuities, the rule against unreasonable 
restraints on alienation, and the so-called numerus clausus principle.  The rule 
against perpetuities limits the time period within which a contingent future 
interest must vest, if it is going to vest at all.155  The rule against unreasonable 
restraints on alienation restricts the ability of an owner to impose legally binding 
restrictions on the future transfer of a property interest, either directly or 
indirectly.156  Finally, the numerus clausus principle limits the recognition of 
property interests that do not fit within existing categories of interests, including 
interests subject to unique restrictions on the power of the owner.157  Each of 
these doctrines limits the ability of an owner to place restrictions on a property 
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interest that would bind a future owner, including restrictions based on the use 
of the resource or who can come to hold it.  These doctrines have been 
recognized as serving a number of purposes, including: limiting complexity and 
lowering the information costs that would otherwise be associated with novel 
property interests;158 protecting the autonomy interest of current owners, as 
against past owners;159 avoiding the excessive decomposition of property 
interests into “anticommons” property;160 and reflecting fundamental values 
about how social relationships should be structured.161 
However, each of these doctrines also serves a related purpose of ensuring 
temporal proximity between decision-makers and the resources they control.  
This in turn makes it more likely that a decision about a resource will be made 
by a party with local knowledge that is current.  The currency of local knowledge 
can be quite important because circumstances change and newer information is 
constantly being acquired by parties close to a resource.162  What may have 
seemed an appropriate restriction or condition to place on a resource in the past 
may no longer be so, and current owners are in the best position to assess 
information about changed circumstances. 
For instance, an owner can make an interest contingent on a condition 
regarding the use of the resource or the identity of the owner, which can be a 
potent tool for controlling future activities.  However, under the rule against 
perpetuities, the condition cannot remain indefinitely.  It must be clear within 
the lifespan of a living person plus 21 years whether or not the condition has 
been satisfied.163  The result is that, regardless of the content of the condition, 
eventually a future owner will hold the property interest unconditionally.  The 
rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and the numerus clausus 
principle also limit the ability of an owner to place restrictions on the use or 
transfer of a resource that will run with the property interest (as opposed to 
merely binding a particular successor in title with whom the transferor has 
privity of contract).  The effect is to reinforce the agenda-setting control of the 
current owner,164 who has closer temporal proximity to the resource and is thus 
in a better position to make decisions based on current knowledge of the 
resource. 
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It is still possible for an owner to bind future owners through easements or 
covenants running with the land.  But these tools come with important 
restrictions on content that serve to preserve the agenda-setting control of the 
current owner, who presumptively has the best access to current, local 
knowledge about the resource.165  Moreover, all of these interests are subject to 
modification or termination by a court, on the application of the current owner, 
where relevant conditions have changed.166  This provides an avenue to ensure 
that an owner’s full authority can ultimately be restored if the covenant or 
easement no longer serves its purpose, though admittedly the judge may not be 
as well-positioned as the owner to assess the change in circumstances. 
And so, while the law does permit certain kinds of ongoing restrictions on the 
power of ownership, these are policed both as to content and as to duration, in a 
manner that shows a strong preference for the authority of the current owner, 
who presumptively has the best access to current local knowledge.  It is possible 
that recent trends towards the relaxation or abolition of restrictions on past owner 
control, including the rule against perpetuities, may be justified on other 
grounds.167  However, the local knowledge argument may provide a reason to 
believe that these doctrines do continue to serve an important function. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
I have argued here that one of the most basic functions of a property regime 
is to channel local knowledge of resources into decision-making about them.  
Property rights unite local knowledge about a resource and decision-making 
authority over that resource in the same party.  If this understanding of the 
function of property is correct, then it has significant implications.  The local 
knowledge argument provides an important and largely overlooked justification 
for property rights, at least in certain institutional settings.  This justification is 
potentially contingent on the distribution of resources in a society since the 
knowledge function of property is impaired when ownership is highly 
concentrated.  The local knowledge function of property also helps us 
understand the concept of property, along with some of the basic rules of 
property law.  On this understanding of property, the agenda-setting authority of 
owners is of central significance.  Moreover, the range of property doctrines that 
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positive covenants are typically allowed to run with the land, but they may be removed if the 
obligation becomes excessive.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.12.  See also 
ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at 420−25, 469; POWELL, supra note 130, §§ 34.02, 60.06. 
 166. POWELL, supra note 130, §§ 60.09, 60.10; ZIFF, PROPERTY LAW, supra note 128, at 
479−80. 
 167. On the trend toward abolition of the rule against perpetuities, see Grayson M.P. McCouch, 
Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1291 (2013); Max M. Schanzenbach 
& Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2465 (2006). 
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privilege the rights of those who are close to the resource, physically and 
temporally, seem to follow from property’s role in channeling local knowledge. 
Channeling local knowledge is not the only function that successful property 
systems must fulfill, but it is an important one.  It is also one of the functions of 
property most consistently neglected by property scholars.  To some extent, this 
neglect is understandable, given that issues related to fine-tuning existing legal 
institutions tend to be more salient than basic functions we may tend to take for 
granted.168  However, a complete understanding of property as an institution 
requires an appreciation for the knowledge function served by devolving 
authority over resources to particular owners.  I hope this article contributes to a 
fuller understanding of that function. 
 
 
 168. Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property?, supra note 4, at 398. 
